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Power and Geopolitics along the Mekong: 
The Laos–Vietnam Negotiation on the 
Xayaburi Dam 
Gabriele Giovannini 
Abstract: This article is the first account of an overlooked aspect of the 
Xayaburi Dam, currently under construction in Laos in the mainstream 
of the Lower Mekong River; namely, the negotiations between Laos and 
Vietnam. Despite broad consensus among scholars and observers that 
Vietnam and Laos had diverging interests and preferences regarding the 
Xayaburi Dam, how Laos went ahead with the project despite Vietnam’s 
explicit opposition to it has so far remained completely uncharted. This 
article aims to fill this knowledge gap by focusing on the state-to-state 
level of the Xayaburi Dam and addressing the factors that enabled Laos 
to pursue its interests prevailing over Vietnam despite the clear power 
asymmetry that shapes the bilateral relationship. The article concludes 
that geopolitical factors have limited Vietnam’s leverage and its capacity 
to implement effective countermeasures to prevent Laos going ahead 
with the construction of the dam and have led to a positive outcome in 
relational power terms for Laos.  
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Introduction 
On 7 November 2012, Laos organised a ground-breaking ceremony for 
the 3.7 billion USD Xayaburi Dam on the Mekong mainstream. This 
specific multibillion-USD hydropower project holds extraordinary dip-
lomatic relevance, as evidenced not only by the large number of newspa-
per and magazine articles – the search term “Xayaburi Dam” returns 
more than 60,000 results on Google – but also by the academic research 
carried out by political scientists, who have focused on the political di-
mension of the problem – see, in particular, works by Cronin and Ham-
lin (2012), Thabchumpon and Middleton (2012), Geheb, West and Mat-
thews (2015), Hensengerth (2015), Mirumachi (2015), and Suhardiman, 
Giordano, and Molle (2015).  
Figure 1. Xayaburi: The First Mainstream Dam in the Lower Mekong 
 
Source:  Energy in Asia. 
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A paper published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) in Washington underlines the fact that “some diplomats and 
officials in the region have quietly begun to describe the Mekong River 
as the next ‘South China Sea’” (Phuong 2014: 3). These studies all stress 
the conflict between the interests of Laos and Vietnam’s regarding the 
dam, but a crucial question remains unexplored: how was Laos able to 
pursue its interest and in so doing prevailing over Vietnam, one of its 
closest allies but one far more powerful than itself? The bilateral relation-
ship between Laos and Vietnam is clearly asymmetric. In 2014, according 
to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Vietnam’s GDP was nearly 16 
times that of Laos and its population 13 times larger. Since the end of 
the Vietnam War in 1975, the two countries have shared a “special rela-
tionship” that has built on the 1977 Treaty on Friendship and Coopera-
tion, in which Vietnam is without doubt the stronger party (Pholsena 
and Banomyong 2006).  
The present article assumes that states are unitary and rational enti-
ties and, by focusing on the relationship between states, looks at the 
international diplomatic side of the Xayaburi Dam issue rather than at 
the environmental, social, economic and legal dimensions. Those are 
equally important matters but have already been addressed by, among 
others, Jakkrit (2015), Le (2013), Baran et al. (2011), Rieu-Clarke (2015) 
and King (2015). Therefore, by focusing on the international dimension 
of the Xayaburi Dam issue, and thanks to the data collected through a 
set of 13 intensive semi-structured elite interviews1 with diplomats, gov-
ernment officers, academics and other stakeholders involved in the Xa-
yaburi project, this article provides first-hand original information, shed-
ding new light on the aspect of the Xayaburi negotiations that have re-
ceived the least coverage.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into four main sections. The 
first section sets the context in which the dam has been planned and in 
which construction has begun by illustrating Laos’s policies related to 
hydropower development. The second section provides a full recon-
struction of the negotiations between Laos and Vietnam, tracing the 
process at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels and highlighting 
stakes, priorities and implications. The third section takes stock of the 
data provided by the previous one in order to interpret and explain the 
different phases and steps of the negotiations. The fourth and final sec-
tion systematically analyses the findings to observe the impact in rela-
tional power terms.  
                                                 
1  The list is available as an appendix at the end of the article.  
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The Policy Context: The Mekong River as a 
Key Development Resource for Laos’ “Battery 
of Southeast Asia” Policy 
Laos accounts for the largest share (25 per cent) of the Mekong’s drain-
age basin of 790,000 sq. km (greater than Thailand’s 23 per cent and 
China’s 21 per cent) and for 35 per cent of the water discharged into the 
sea, followed by Thailand and Cambodia (18 per cent), China (16 per 
cent) and Vietnam (11 per cent). Equally important is Laos’s mountain-
ous morphology: thanks to the beneficial elevation of its territory, Laos 
has high hydropower potential. It is no surprise, therefore, that the coun-
try has sought to tap the river’s potential in order to increase its exports 
and improve its poor account balance exploiting the “peace dividends” 
provided by the end of the conflict in the region that allowed to trans-
form the Mekong from a “Cold War front line into a corridor of com-
merce” (Bakker 1999: 209).  
The interest in hydropower and the related policy of focusing on it 
to increase the country’s exports potential and attract foreign exchange 
was then conceptualised in the formula of becoming the “battery of 
Southeast Asia” in the coming decades as a key national strategy 
(Weatherbee 1997). Therefore, for the Government of Laos (GoL), 
implementing hydropower facilities became a necessary path towards 
economic development and poverty reduction2 and the sector was iden-
tified as a priority in order to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals, with the aim of graduating from the status of least developed 
country (LDC) by 2020 (Vongsay 2013). In addition, given Laos’s lack of 
financial resources and technologies, hydropower development concur-
rently appeared to be a viable method of attracting foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) (Geheb, West, and Matthews 2015). The hydropower sector 
was a key component in leading Laos’s economic growth, as underlined 
by Hansakul and Wollensak (2012). It is estimated that, together with the 
mining sector it accounts for some 25 per cent of Laos’s economic 
growth and 15 per cent of its total export revenues (Moungcharoen of 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2013). These fulfilments were 
made possible by the rapid economic growth of the region, which stimu-
lated a steady increase in demand for electricity among Laos’s neighbours. 
                                                 
2  For reference, see the National Policy “Environmental and Social Sustainability 
of the Hydropower Sector in Lao PDR”, signed on 7 June 2005 by the current 
Lao Prime Minister, Thongloun Sisoulith (Government of Lao People’s Dem-
ocratic Republic 2005). 
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As can be seen in Figure 2 below, the tremendous increase in electricity 
generation that took place in Laos in 2010 – provoked by the 1075 MW 
Nam Theun II Dam coming into operation – was almost completely 
absorbed by exports.  
Figure 2. Laos’s Electricity Market (MW, 1994–2011) 
 
Source:  Vongsay (2013). 
In this context, it is unsurprising that the Mekong River is at the core of 
Laos’s hydropower policy. The GoL has plans to use the river’s unex-
ploited potential to build a cascade of nine mainstream dams that, once 
operational, will have a total capacity of nearly 10,000 MW, which repre-
sents approximately 38 per cent of Laos’s total estimated theoretical 
hydropower potential 26,000 MW (Vongsay 2013). 
Thus, these nine mainstream projects combined have enormous 
economic relevance for the GoL as they are expected to attract some 25 
billion USD in FDI and generate 2.6 billion USD of yearly revenues 
from electricity exports; that is, more than two-thirds of the country’s 
total (Stone 2011, cited in Matthews 2012: 394). However, such projects 
have been delayed for years as a consequence of their economic and 
technical complexity and of the uncertainty regarding their environmen-
tal impact, which has especially worried the downstream countries of 
Cambodia and Vietnam. The Xayaburi Dam changed this story, becom-
ing the first mainstream hydropower facility under construction in the 
lower branch of the Mekong. The next section provides an analysis of 
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the process that led to the official ground-breaking ceremony for the 
project in November 2012. 
Reconstruction of the Laos–Vietnam  
Negotiations on the Xayaburi Dam  
Once completed, the Xayaburi Dam, a 3.8-billion-USD and 1,285 MW 
power plant currently under construction in the Xayaburi province of 
Laos, will be the first mainstream dam in the Lower Mekong Basin 
(LMB). As with general plans for hydropower development in the Lower 
Mekong, highlighted in the previous section, the origin of the Xayaburi 
project can be found in the Indicative Basin Plan drafted by the Mekong 
Committee, the predecessor of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 
1970. In that plan, the location was “identified as a potential mainstream 
dam site” (Geheb, West, and Matthews 2015: 112). The GoL dusted off 
the project in the first few years of the 21st century and appeared to be 
ready for concrete steps in 2007 when the negotiations and the bidding 
process took place, leading to a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
being signed on 4 May 2007 between the GoL and the Thai construction 
company Ch. Karnchang, whose proposal won over those of another 
Thai company and the American AES Corporation (United States Em-
bassy in Vientiane 2007a). In order to build the dam on 22 June 2010, 
the Xayaburi Power Company Limited (XPCL) was registered in Laos, 
where the headquarters were established. Three months later, on 29 
October 2010 the company signed a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
agreement with the GoL, according to which, XPLC, after having built 
the Xayaburi Dam, would operate it for 29 years from the beginning of 
commercial operation (that is, until 2048), before transferring the dam to 
the GoL.3 
This section presents an analysis of the complex negotiation that 
took place from that time – until the official ground-breaking ceremony 
held on 7 November 2012 at the dam site, focusing on the preferences 
and actions of Laos and Vietnam. 
  
                                                 
3  All the information regarding the Xayaburi Power Company Limited can be 
accessed at the company’s official website: <www.xayaburi.com>.  
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The First Phase: Multilateral Negotiations within 
the Mekong River Commission 
Being a mainstream dam, the Xayaburi project needed to go through the 
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) 
required by the 1995 Mekong Agreement (Mekong River Commission 
1995). Thus, the Xayaburi case became the first in which the MRC ap-
plied this six-month long process, which formally began on 22 October 
2010 following the submission from Laos one month earlier (Mekong 
River Commission 2011). As Hensengerth emphasised, “during the fol-
lowing six months, the standard duration of the PNPCA, the four gov-
ernments were unable to reach a compromise” (Hensengerth 2015: 918). 
On 15 April 2011, just a week before the end of the six-month period, 
Vietnam submitted the “Form for Reply to Prior Consultation” to the 
MRC through the Viet Nam National Mekong Committee (The Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam 2011). That document clearly identifies Vietnam’s 
concerns related to upstream dam developments in terms of food and 
water security for its vital Delta region, stressing that “the Mekong Delta 
is vital to food and water security and for the livelihood of nearly 20 
million people of Viet Nam” and how “upstream hydropower develop-
ment, especially the mainstream cascade, will present serious threats to 
the Mekong Delta, in particular saline intrusion, reduced fisheries and 
agricultural productivities, and degradation of bio-diversity” (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam 2011: 2).  
The document concludes by appealing to the close friendship be-
tween Hanoi and Vientiane and for cooperation among Mekong ripari-
ans, which should prevent unilateral benefits and damage to other states. 
It asserts that: 
Viet Nam expects that its requests will be taken thoroughly and 
seriously into account by Lao PDR in the “Mekong Spirit”4 and 
fully in line with all principles set forth in the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement and the recent Hua Hin Declaration. Viet Nam wishes 
to reiterate its strongest commitment and full cooperation with other 
Member Countries, especially Lao PDR, the close friend of Viet 
Nam, in their respective endeavours toward its own prosperity, 
but not at the expense of the environmental health of the Basin as well as of 
                                                 
4  As Mirumachi (2015) underlined, the discourse about the management of the 
shared water resources of the Mekong “is often associated with the ‘Mekong 
Spirit’, or the goodwill of the states to work together despite being political ad-
versaries” (Mirumachi 2015: 106). 
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other riparian countries. (The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2011: 3, 
emphasis added) 
Four days later, the MRC members attended a special session of the 
MRC’s Joint Committee in Vientiane, in which they recognised the im-
possibility of reaching an agreement and the need for the issue to be 
discussed at the ministerial level (International Rivers 2014). As one 
MRC technical advisor explained in an interview, the various riparian 
countries had different opinions, which led downstream ones to demand 
a 10-year moratorium to allow a comprehensive assessment of the envi-
ronmental risks (Vogel 2011). Vietnam’s request for a 10-year moratori-
um was based on the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Hydropow-
er on the Mekong Mainstream, prepared by the International Center for 
Environmental Management (ICEM) for the Mekong River Commission 
and published in 2010 (ICEM 2010). 
Once the six-month period was over, Laos claimed that the PNPCA 
was automatically finished (International Rivers 2014). According to a 
senior researcher, Laos did not see the Xayaburi Dam as a transboundary 
project and it considered that the PNPCA had forced Laos to do some-
thing that it did not want to and that had never happened before. Con-
sequently, the GoL felt that it was already granting considerable conces-
sions (Interviewee 6). Suhardiman, Giordano, and Molle (2015) stressed 
that “fearing opposition from its downstream neighbors, and from Vi-
etnam in particular as its closest ally (Inter Press Service 2011; Voice of Amer-
ica 2011a), Laos agreed to conduct more studies to assess the dam’s envi-
ronmental impacts” (Suhardiman, Giordano, and Molle 2015: 212).  
The Second Phase: Negotiating at the  
Government Level 
So, despite the Laos prime minister’s reassurances to his Vietnamese 
counterpart, Nguyen Tan Dung, during the 18th ASEAN Summit, which 
was held in Jakarta in early May 2011 (Thanh Nien News 2011), the GoL 
did not actually stop the project. This became evident shortly after the 
meeting in Indonesia, since Laos went ahead with its arrangements with 
the Thai developer, communicating to Ch. Karnchang in June of the 
same year that the PNPCA process was over and that the project could 
move forward (International Rivers 2014). This happened even though 
the compliance report commissioned from Pöyry Energy AG, the Swiss 
subsidiary of the Finnish consulting company, by the GoL in May 2011 
had yet to be released. The GoL had to commission such a report given 
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the divergences – and pressures from downstream countries – that 
emerged during the PNPCA process and the lack of an MRC mechanism 
to assess compliance with its standards (King 2015). The report aimed to 
alleviate downstream concerns and did confirm that the GoL complied 
with the MRC Design Guidelines and had taken into consideration the 
comments submitted by the other parties within the Prior Consultation 
process. However, it also pointed to the need for “adaptations and im-
provements” related to “sediment transport through the reservoir” and 
to “fish passing facilities” to be carried out during the construction 
(Pöyry Energy AG 2011: 9).  
In an interview with the author, Hans Guttman, chief executive of-
ficer of the MRC from 14 November 2011 for three years, recalled that:  
in April 2011, Cambodia asked for more studies and Vietnam for 
a moratorium of 10 years with respect to the proposed Xayaburi 
Dam. Thailand’s position was unclear, probably it was uncertain. 
Laos took note of this and discussion followed until the MRC 
Council meeting of 8th December 2011, where it was agreed to 
conduct more studies, but in which Vietnam and Cambodia did 
not change their opinion since they deemed the degree of uncer-
tainty unacceptable. From the perspective of Vietnam and Cam-
bodia the PNPCA process has never been completed, but has 
been suspended. However, Laos (who considered the PNPCA 
completed after 6 months) informed Thailand that the process 
was complete. (Interviewee 4) 
On 17 April 2012 Ch. Karnchang publicly informed the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand that its Lao subsidiary had signed a contract with the Xaya-
buri Power Company: the “Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
Contract for the Xayaburi Hydroelectric Power Project” (The Nation 
2012). By declaring that the construction had commenced on 15 March 
2012, the GoL appeared determined to go ahead with the project. In July 
2012, the diplomatic repartee showed a new surge, with Vietnam and 
Cambodia asking to halt the construction. The Lao Minister of Foreign 
Affairs said it had stopped but was contradicted by the Ministry of Ener-
gy and Mines (MEM) of Laos on the same day. These declarations were 
followed by a visit to the dam site, organised by the MEM in response to 
an MRC request, which was attended by some 70 foreign delegates 
(International Rivers 2014). The last phase of the negotiations, before 
Laos officially gave the green light to the project, took place in early 
September 2012. On 7 September, just one day after the Vientiane Times 
reported that the Xayaburi Dam would have gone ahead (Vientiane Times 
2012), the then-president of Vietnam, Truong Tan Sang, intervening at 
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the APEC 2012 CEO Summit in Vladivostok (Russia), defined water as 
the oil of the 21st century and mentioned Vietnam’s recent proposal for 
getting the Mekong countries to cooperate with Japan in conducting 
“research on sustainable utilization and development of the Mekong 
River, including research on the impact of hydro-power dams on the 
mainstream” (Truong 2012). The Vietnamese president did not mention 
Laos or the Xayaburi Dam directly but the timing of the speech and his 
references to upstream Mekong mainstream dams, as well as to the 
threat to the “largest granary of Vietnam” (the Delta), left very few 
doubts about the target of his discourse. 
Laos Begins the Project 
The ground-breaking ceremony for the Xayaburi Dam in Laos, held on 7 
November 2012, demonstrated that the GoL’s decision to go ahead was 
anything but easy. In fact, the news came out in the media suddenly on 5 
November, while dozens of heads of state were engaged at the ASEM 9 
meeting in Vientiane. The next day, Prime Minister Thongsing Tham-
mavong of Laos denied that a ground-breaking ceremony was scheduled, 
telling the Wall Street Journal that the event was just a visit for the press 
and for experts and that it did not signal the start of the project (Otto 
2012; Vandenbrink 2012). However, this was not the case at all, as the 
banner prepared for the day made clear. Diplomatic representatives of 
the neighbouring countries attended the event, including the ambassador 
of Vietnam, Dr Ta Minh Chau (Latsaphao 2012). Somsavat Lengsavad, 
deputy prime minister of Laos, who superintended the ceremony, de-
clared that “We had the opportunity to listen to the views and opinions 
of different countries along the river. We have come to an agreement 
and chose today to be the first day to begin the project” (Chenaphun 
2012). 
The report of the event by the state-owned Vientiane Times ran along 
the same lines, stating that “There has been much conjecture about the 
project, but the Lao government is now confident it has satisfied all 
parties with a redesign of the dam, and has undertaken hydrological and 
fish migration studies” (Latsaphao 2012: 1) and claiming Laos’s right to 
exploit its own resources by building a run-of-river dam similar to many 
projects developed in the United States and in Europe. The redesign 
mentioned in the quotation above, as well as in the one below, refers to 
the changes introduced to the project following the above-mentioned 
compliance report prepared by Pöyry and can be understood as proof of 
Laos’s willingness to be (and appear) cooperative despite remaining firm 
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in its intention to start construction. According to a subsequent report 
by Pöyry, the redesign resulted in additional costs of 100 million USD 
and in changes to the seismic design, a navigation lock to allow fish mi-
gration, and the introduction of low-level outlets and turbines to permit 
sediments and fish to pass through (Schmidiger and Sierotzki 2015). 
The Vientiane Times’ article, which can be considered very much 
equivalent to an official declaration released through the newspaper’s 
pages, concluded that: 
the government is now of the firm opinion that the project has 
been properly and thoroughly researched. Every effort has been 
made to consider the various processes required to improve the 
design in order to build a “transparent” dam that will have no im-
pact on the geology of the Mekong. The redesign has been tested 
and found to be viable through the use of a specially constructed 
hydraulic model. Friendly countries no longer oppose the dam’s 
construction, and the Lao government is now fully confident 
about making the decision to go ahead with the project. 
(Latsaphao 2012: 3) 
Laos Pursues its Interests despite Vietnam’s 
Divergent Preferences 
The outcome of the negotiations, after Vietnam’s public opposition to 
the dam, seems to have clearly gone in favour of Laos. After all, through 
the Xayaburi Dam Laos secured its economic-strategic interest by devel-
oping one of its few available resources (hydropower), which is consid-
ered crucial both for domestic consumption and for export opportunities, 
in direct contrast to downstream Vietnam’s interest in environmental 
safeguards, which were explicitly linked by Vietnamese officials to food 
and human security.  
In addition to this development constituting an advancement in its 
national policy of becoming the “battery of Southeast Asia”, Laos, as 
stressed by the former CEO of the MRC, Hans Guttman,  
Expects 150 million USD per year from the concession period of 
27 years. Even though official records in 2013 estimated that the 
revenue would be around 130 million USD, this is a huge amount 
of money for Laos, higher than the 80 million USD in yearly reve-
nue generated by the Nam Theun 2 Dam. (Interviewee 4) 
Here, Guttman is referring a report released by the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines in 2013, according to which the GoL “expects to earn US$3.9 
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billion from the Xayaboury dam throughout the 29-year concession 
period” (Vientiane Times 2013: 21); that is, 134.4 million USD per year. 
Therefore, considering all the direct and indirect public statements 
reported above in relation to Vietnam’s standpoint on the Xayaburi Dam, 
the generally accepted interpretation of the issue is one of Vietnam disa-
greeing with the dam but somehow inexplicably being forced to accept 
the fait accompli and Laos’s unilateral course of action – see, for instance, 
Otto (2012) or Herbertson (2013). For some analysts, Laos’s decision to 
move forward had the potential to destabilise the diplomatic ties of the 
two countries sufficiently to jeopardise the peaceful and prosperous 
equilibrium that the entire region had finally achieved after decades of 
war (Cronin and Hamlin 2012).  
However, the length and complexity of the negotiation process, 
along with the economic – and political – interests at stake for the two 
countries, suggest it is important to critically examine what appears to be 
a clear-cut diplomatic victory for Laos (supported by the investor coun-
try, Thailand, as highlighted by Matthews (2012) and Hensengerth (2015), 
among others) over the downstream riparian Vietnam (and Cambodia). 
Hanoi reacted to the ground-breaking by sending the Vietnamese ambas-
sador to Laos to attend the ceremony, and it must also be highlighted 
that a statement released by Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, 
Luong Thanh Nghi, the next day avoided openly criticising the GoL’s 
decision to go ahead, simply saying in general terms that “he hoped Laos 
will work with Viet Nam, Cambodia and Thailand in conducting careful 
and comprehensive research on the cumulative impacts on the environ-
ment, economics and society of all hydro-power plants expected to be 
built on the Mekong River”, apparently accepting the fait accompli (Viet 
Nam News 2012). However, during the MRC Council meeting of January 
2013 in Luang Prabang, Nguyen Thai Lai, Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of 
Natural Resources and Environment, asked for the works on the dam to 
be halted, eliciting a sharp response from Viraphonh Viravong, who said 
that Laos would not continue the consultation and that his country had 
already gone beyond the Mekong Agreement. Viraphonh Viravong put a 
definitive end to the discussion, stating assertively that “after six months, 
all you can do is record the difference of opinions and that is the end of 
the process” (Chen 2013). 
Therefore, in order to understand how Laos managed to achieve 
such a result, an in-depth analysis has been conducted to explore the 
negotiation process that led to the ground-breaking ceremony summa-
rised above, drawing extensively from the primary data provided by the 
interviewees, which enabled the author to look behind the scenes and 
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beyond what has already been publicly said by the two sides and reported 
by public sources. The first purpose of the analysis is to understand how 
Laos prevailed over Vietnam despite the asymmetry of power. Since the 
outcome has been known – construction of the Xayaburi project began 
in 2012 and has never stopped, and the dam is expected to start opera-
tions by 2019 – the main unanswered question is how Laos managed to 
start the project unilaterally, at the same time avoiding strong retaliation 
from Vietnam or any other strong diplomatic reaction. 
Inevitably, the Xayaburi issue falls within the wider bilateral – and 
asymmetric – special relationship and involves all four members of the 
MRC and has a regional scope. A senior Lao official illustrates the bigger 
picture in this regard, which includes four countries: two that have al-
ready developed their water resources (Vietnam and Thailand) and two 
later developers (Laos and Cambodia). Since all the planned mainstream 
hydropower plants are in Laos and Cambodia, there is no natural har-
mony of interests (Interviewee 2).  
Hans Guttman also confirmed that Vietnam’s reaction surprised 
Laos, which, given its very strong relationship, had anticipated that Ha-
noi would support its economic development (Interviewee 4). Another 
Lao official recalled that in private meetings Vietnam always said ‘no’ to 
the Xayaburi Dam and that even though during official visits Lao and 
Vietnamese leaders hug and kiss each other, when they move on to Me-
kong affairs, the atmosphere becomes frosty. “The core of the relation-
ship is still okay, but there is an elephant in the room now that is chang-
ing the pattern”, the official said (Interviewee 2).  
These interviews accurately define the geopolitical concerns that 
could lie behind the Xayaburi Dam, as well as its relevance for the Laos–
Vietnam special relationship. The quotes above contain crucial implica-
tions that will be highlighted below, but the interviewees raise two main 
points. First, the Xayaburi Dam has much to do with international rela-
tions between Laos and Vietnam, to the extent that it can be seen as a 
test of the bilateral special relationship itself. Second, the issue does not 
relate exclusively to Laos and Vietnam but is framed and negotiated in a 
complex geopolitical spectrum where the role of actors such as Thailand 
and China must be considered. In light of these considerations, the next 
section will examine the negotiations between Vientiane and Hanoi, 
showing how the former prevailed, and will also thoroughly assess the 
implications and role of the broader geopolitical complex. 
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Analysis of the Negotiations 
What Prevented a Stronger Reaction from Vietnam? 
After construction began on 7 November 2012, it was possible to ob-
serve signals that behind closed doors the issue was being dealt with at 
the highest level between Hanoi and Vientiane given that – as already 
stressed – the Vietnamese ambassador in Laos attended the ground-
breaking ceremony and that the spokesperson of the Vietnamese Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), speaking the next day, avoided openly 
blaming the GoL. Lao leaders at the ground-breaking ceremony declared 
that all countries were happy with the project, so it is not surprising that 
it is also shared by a member of the Lao National Mekong Committee 
(LNMC), who explained how, after the PNPCA and after the project 
had been redesigned, all countries were happy with the new version, 
which, for example, added five facilities for the passage of fish. The 
interviewee added that the project had to be monitored, but there was no 
problem since members of the MRC were still working together and 
there were visits to the dam site every three months (Interviewee 3). This 
was echoed by an official of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) 
of the Lao Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), 
who emphasised that transparency and focus on details were crucial 
elements in reaching a compromise 5  and concluded that “We never 
thought to leave the 1995 agreement, although American and Vietnam-
ese NGOs published statements that we were close to doing so” (Inter-
viewee 11).  
However, while Lao officials involved in the “Mekong affairs” put 
the stress on details and transparency, an official of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs (MOFA) of Laos, as well as a consultant close to the Lao 
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), claimed that the agreement 
was reached at the highest level. The MOFA representative stressed that 
a compromise was possible because the Vietnamese government under-
stood Laos’s position on the issue to some extent (Interviewee 5). The 
interviewee here referred to the absolute priority that the GoL had given 
to the Xayaburi project. In addition to these inputs from Lao officials, 
similar statements were made by an ambassador of another ASEAN 
                                                 
5  The reference to a compromise contained in this interview, and any following 
references to a compromise or to an agreement between Laos and Vietnam on the 
issue, relate to the fact that the two countries avoided a more direct and strong-
er confrontation on the Xayaburi issue described in this section, and do not in-
dicate any official or specific agreement or deal signed by the two governments. 
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country in Vientiane, who was convinced that after going through the 
MRC procedure, and after adopting revisions to the dam relating to 
fisheries and sediments, Vietnam agreed (Interviewee 9). A Vietnamese 
scientist who worked for the MRC noted that Laos went ahead after 
representatives of the two countries sat down together and reached 
agreement, contending that Vietnam said, “You can go ahead but you 
have to make sure the best mitigation of the impact is put in place and 
when we have problems you have to cooperate” (Interviewee 13). Signif-
icantly, however, in an interview with the author that took place three 
years after the inauguration event, a senior Vietnamese diplomat ex-
plained that  
After Laos conducted environmental studies on the impact for 
fish and the environment more generally, we agreed. It is also rel-
evant that although there are concerns about environmental as-
pects, all Laos’s neighbours are interested in investing. If Vietnam 
does not invest there are other countries ready to replace us. It is 
also a fact that people and offices in the North of Vietnam are less 
concerned than local authorities and people in the South of Vi-
etnam. (Interviewee 12) 
The words of the Vietnamese diplomat, who cannot be named, com-
bined with the positions of the Lao sources reported above, corroborate 
the argument that, despite the divergence of interests between the two 
countries, at some point before 7 November 2012 they reached a com-
promise that avoided worsening the dispute and causing further confron-
tation or conflict to erupt. It is clear from the last passage that the issue 
was not dominated only by environmental and economic calculations, 
with various factors, ranging from geopolitical considerations to domes-
tic elements, also informing the negotiations, making it a multidimen-
sional process.  
The fact that Vietnam continued to express its concerns after the 
ground-breaking ceremony – during the MRC Council meeting held in 
Luang Prabang in January 2013, for instance – could appear to contradict 
the findings that a compromise was reached. However, the fact confirms 
the substantial divergence between the preferences of the two states and 
can be explained by two factors. First, as indicated by former MRC’s 
CEO Hans Guttman, with respect to the evolving understanding of the 
likely impacts of the Xayaburi Dam, Vietnam may have preferred to save 
face and keep up appearances: “Vietnam is facing different opinions on 
the Xayaburi Dam issue”, he said, “but it is difficult to change their posi-
tion. Although from 2013 the pressure decreased (there were high-level 
meetings), they cannot explicitly change their position” (Interviewee 4). 
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The second reason can be found in the different views and priorities of 
different ministries and agencies; the fact that the Xayaburi Dam was the 
first mainstream dam in the Lower Mekong, and thus the first test of the 
incompatible interests of the riparian countries, may have created prob-
lems for the Vietnamese government. Explaining that Laos was surprised 
by Vietnam’s reaction, Guttman argued that “it is likely that different 
factions in the Vietnamese government had different opinions but finally 
the threat to the Mekong Delta was considered paramount”, adding that 
“it should be noted that although Hanoi had strong words over Xayaburi 
there was no noticeable reduction in other assistance and cooperation 
between Laos and Vietnam” (Interviewee 4). For the central government 
in Hanoi, it was also difficult to push too much against the Xayaburi 
project because such a position could hardly be viewed as sustainable if 
one considers that Vietnam’s “position to defer mainstream dam devel-
opment contradicts its ambition to proceed with national hydropower 
plan (ie, Lower Sesan 2) regardless of its downstream impacts (to Cam-
bodia)” (Suhardiman, Giordano, and Molle 2015: 211) and that Central 
Highland dams in the country create similar environmental problems (Le 
2013; Geheb, West, and Matthews 2015). These two factors explain why, 
in the MRC, the Viet Nam National Mekong Committee continued to 
publicly express its concerns without undermining the state-to-state 
compromise reached by its government with Vientiane. 
The next section examines in greater depth the role of the wider ge-
opolitical and strategic context, first by providing an overall assessment 
and then by focusing on the most important actors. 
The Role of the Geopolitical Context 
The above analysis points to the fact that the most important factor that 
prevented Vietnam from taking an even stronger stance on Laos’s hy-
dropower project and from reacting in a stronger way can be found in 
the common history that shapes the Laos–Vietnam bilateral relations 
that inform Vietnam’s long-term foreign policy strategy. It can be noted 
that Lao officials highlighted in the interviews the virtues of the dam 
itself, as well as their country’s open and transparent behaviour, while the 
Vietnamese ones underlined factors such as the strength of the bilateral 
relationship and the capacity to cooperate, the need to face economic 
competition, and indirect benefits. In this respect, the reference by the 
Vietnamese diplomat to the need to consider the fact that other coun-
tries might “replace” Vietnam as an investor in Laos must not be over-
looked. Thanks to the context in which this statement was placed, and 
especially considering that the same interviewee also explicitly said that 
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the two countries eventually reached a compromise, as well as appealing 
to their close friendship, it seems that the Vietnamese diplomat’s allusion 
to the problem of competition can be seen not only as the expression of 
the contingent need to cooperate in spite of Laos’s adverse behaviour, 
but also as a strategic imperative dictated by the common past of the two 
states (and leaderships), as well as by Hanoi’s long-term foreign policy 
strategy. As is evident from the Vietnamese diplomat’s words, with Laos 
having a great strategic importance for Vietnam, another interviewee 
suggested that Hanoi could have feared that making too much trouble in 
the Xayaburi case could have resulted in a less favourable attitude by 
Laos towards Vietnamese interests and investments (Interviewee 1). 
Another informant underlined how:  
the Xayaburi dam is a perfect case to illustrate both the connec-
tion between the two countries and the willingness of Laos to test 
this partnership. In fact, Laos, with the financial and diplomatic 
support of Thailand, is going ahead with an infrastructure which 
might be costly for Vietnam. Nonetheless, Vietnam cannot be too 
openly critical because of the historical special relationship with 
Laos and because of the increasing role played by China in the 
country, especially through massive investment. It means that the 
Vietnamese government needs to manage its relationship with 
Laos carefully, also due to the emergence of leaders in the Lao po-
litical spectrum who are increasingly closer to Beijing than to Ha-
noi.6 (Interviewee 2) 
This point of view is also shared by the Laos historian Martin Stuart-Fox, 
who, in an interview with Bloomberg News, declared that “from the Viet-
namese side, they would have to be very reluctant to put too much pres-
sure on Laos out of concern it would just push them into the arms of the 
Chinese” (Bloomberg News 2014). In addition, the powerfulness of the 
bilateral ties must be put in perspective: the combined effect of fears of 
competition for influence over Laos and the fact that, despite the serious 
threat posed to the Delta region by the dam, the issue was probably not 
considered a matter of life or death in Hanoi. As mentioned above, the 
Xayaburi Dam negotiation process can be seen as difficult but not worth 
compromising good relations for (Interviewee 10). The relative im-
portance within the broader bilateral ties between Hanoi and Vientiane 
persuaded the former of the need to appear cooperative, regardless of 
how reluctantly this was done. Indeed, according to another interviewee, 
at the end of the consultation phase of the PNPCA process, Vietnam did 
                                                 
6  Kingsbury (2017) underlined this potential shift within the Lao leadership. 
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not agree but preferred to keep a low profile in order to show its good-
will towards a harmonious coexistence (Interviewee 7).  
Thailand’s Direct Support for Laos 
Besides the relative importance of the issue within the GoV’s priorities, 
it is also necessary to consider that while the Xayaburi Dam was not 
perceived as a vital matter in Hanoi, it had much higher importance for 
other actors. As pointed out by Associate Professor Ruth Banomyong, 
head of the Department of International Business, Logistics and 
Transport at Thammasat University in Bangkok and co-author of one of 
the rare accounts on Laos’s geopolitics,7 “Vietnam never agreed on the 
Xayaburi Dam, but could not do much. Other actors had more influence, 
especially Thailand since it will buy most of the energy produced by the 
dam” (Interviewee 8). The predominance of Thai interests has also been 
stressed by Laos’s Vice Minister of Energy and Mines, Viraphonh Vi-
ravong, who argued: “It would be too expensive for anyone to damage 
the project. It’s like starting a war. The stakes are too high for Thailand” 
(Janssen 2015). This reasoning refers to the fact, already mentioned 
above, that the Thai company Ch. Karnchang owns the majority of the 
shares, Thai EGAT will buy 95 per cent of the produced electricity, and 
funding is provided mainly by Thai financiers. Thailand has a lot to gain 
from projects like the Xayaburi Dam. In fact, Thailand’s stance on the 
project was informed by two key national priorities that perfectly match 
Laos’s “battery of Southeast Asia” policy: the internationalisation of 
hydropower production and the diversification of its energy mix, which 
is currently dominated by hydrocarbons, with fossil fuels accounting for 
98 per cent of the country’s primary energy consumption in 2014 (Ox-
ford Business Group 2016). First, the purpose of internationalising the 
production of electricity from hydropower derives from the strong anti-
hydropower social movement inside Thailand and from the fact that the 
internal potential has already been exploited. Second, Thailand has a 
particular interest in diversifying its energy mix because it relies on natu-
ral gas imported from Myanmar for its electricity production (Matthews 
2012; Jakkrit 2015; Cronin and Hamlin 2012).  
In this respect, as the figure below shows, Laos represents a crucial 
partner for Thailand, considering that all electricity provided to EGAT 
by countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) comes from facili-
ties located in Laos, but also, and more importantly, given the share the 
Xayaburi Dam will account for. 
                                                 
7  The already cited work by Pholsena and Banomyong (2006).  
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Figure 3. GMS Power Project Sales to EGAT 
 
Source:  Moungcharoen (2013). 
China’s Economic-Strategic Goals 
Although China had no stake in the Xayaburi project itself, it is nonethe-
less a major hydropower developer in the region, had completed four 
mainstream dams in its branch of the Mekong at the time, and had 
signed agreements with the GoL for four out of nine proposed Mekong 
mainstream dams. Besides its role as a potential investor, China can be 
considered as the “enabling actor” since, as Trandem stressed, “China’s 
own upstream dam construction on the Mekong has helped pave the 
way for the Lower Mekong mainstream dams to re-emerge on the re-
gion’s agenda” (Trandem 2011). Therefore, being the first in the main-
stream hydropower cascade envisioned by Laos (and Cambodia) in the 
Lower Mekong, the Xayaburi case was of crucial importance in opening 
the door for the other 10 planned dams. Beyond China’s interest in set-
ting a precedent in the Lower Mekong Basin, the Xayaburi Dam was also 
highly relevant for Beijing from a strategic point of view. As a Stratfor 
brief published back in April 2011 stressed:  
As Vientiane opened up its economy and accelerated integration 
with regional markets, especially with Thailand and China […] a 
  82 Gabriele Giovannini 
 
rebalancing of Vietnam’s strategic influence appears to be under 
way […] China has welcomed Laos’ expanding cooperation with 
Thailand, which it sees as helpful in setting a precedent on hydro-
power and further loosening Laos’ bond with Vietnam. (Stratfor 
Worldview 2011) 
The Overlooked Role of the United States 
Vietnam was not alone in its attempt to prevent the building of the Xa-
yaburi Dam. Besides the Cambodian opposition mentioned above, 
throughout 2012 the United States joined the two downstream Southeast 
Asian countries (Chang 2013). The US’s active opposition to the project 
emerged clearly when the US Congress passed the Mekong River Protec-
tion Act of 2011, instructing the  
United States Executive Directors of the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank to oppose the provision of any loan or 
financial or technical assistance for the construction of hydroelec-
tric dams or electricity transmission systems in the Mekong River 
Basin unless the Secretary submits a related report providing cer-
tain assurances. (US Federal Legislative Information 2011) 
This became evident when the GoL went public and declared its inten-
tions to hold a ground-breaking ceremony on 5 November 2012. On 
that day, the US Department of State released a statement that sharply 
criticised Laos’s decision to go ahead (US Department of State 2012). 
Washington’s opposition can be seen as driven by the intention to sup-
port Vietnam (an important partner for the US), and to counter Chinese 
economic activities in the region. In fact, there is a substantial conver-
gence of interests between the US’s “Pivot to Asia” policy and the ever-
improving Hanoi-Washington partnership; during a visit to the United 
States in 2013, Vietnam’s president, Truong Tan Sang, stressed that the 
two countries would cooperate to preserve the Mekong’s sustainability 
(Hutt 2015).  
However, the United States is linked to the Xayaburi project by a 
specific and direct interest that has surprisingly been completely ignored 
by both media and academic debate on the issue. In 2007, as mentioned 
above, AES Corporation, an American company headquartered in Ar-
lington (Virginia), competed with another Thai company alongside Ch. 
Karnchang to try to win the contract for the Xayaburi Dam. These com-
panies enjoyed full support from the US government, according to three 
diplomatic cables sent by the US embassy in Vientiane between April 
and May 2007 and later released by WikiLeaks in August 2011 (United 
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States Embassy in Vientiane 2007a; United States Embassy in Vientiane 
2007b; United States Embassy in Vientiane 2007c). Of particular rele-
vance is the first cable’s mention of the competition between the Ameri-
can proposal, possibly backed by multilateral development banks such as 
the Asian Development Bank, and the Chinese developer SinoHydro, 
which was believed to be interested in building all four Mekong main-
stream dams planned by the GoL at that time (United States Embassy in 
Vientiane 2007a). Therefore, it can be argued that the outcome of the 
AES bid triggered Washington’s opposition to mainstream hydropower 
development in the Mekong because the US might have realised that all 
the other large mainstream dams were going to be awarded to Chinese or 
other regional competing developers.  
Nonetheless, the analysis of the negotiations and its outcome points 
out that the US had a limited impact on Laos’s decision, arguably be-
cause the economic and political ties with Washington are much less 
intense than those with Hanoi, Beijing and Bangkok.  
A Relational Power Analysis of the Xayaburi 
Case  
As seen above, in the case study of the Xayaburi Dam, the outcome 
appears to be in favour of Laos, despite the clear asymmetry of the bilat-
eral relationship with Vietnam. This section applies an analytical frame-
work to test such conclusion and to observe whether changes of rela-
tional power have occurred. The framework builds on the relational 
conceptualisation of power proper to the Weberian tradition and sys-
tematised by Dahl (1957) and draws upon a recent framework of influ-
ence developed by Goh (2016) and applied in a collective volume ad-
dressing China’s actual influence in developing Asia. The framework is 
articulated in four analytical components designed to carry out a rela-
tional power analysis of the Laos-Vietnam negotiation about the Xaya-
buri Dam and to measure its impact in terms of relational power.  
Assessment of Preferences 
The previous sections have examined the divergence of interests be-
tween the two states, as well as Laos’s success, ; thus, this paper confirms 
the thesis, expressed by the vast majority of scholars and analysts, that 
Vietnam would have preferred a dam-free Lower Mekong River. 
Therefore, the main conclusion from the findings presented herein 
is that the Xayaburi Dam enabled Laos (A) to get Vietnam (B) to do some-
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thing (accept the construction of the dam) that it would not (in an ideal 
scenario; that is, following its own preferences informed by national 
interests) otherwise do. This outcome, according to Dahl’s definition8 of 
relational power, means that the Xayaburi Dam – the independent varia-
ble – had a positive impact on the relational power of Laos in its bilateral 
relations with Vietnam. The clear opposition of Lao and Vietnamese 
preferences on the issue leads to the possibility of power to prevail and at 
the same time as the “potential for establishing causality” (Goh 2016: 12) 
is strengthened. However, to control the consistency of this conclusion 
and to appreciate the ways in which this relational power was expressed 
and materialised, the analytical framework will now be fully applied. First, 
it will be highlighted that the two conditions of relational power can be 
identified in the Xayaburi case. Second, the forms of this power will be 
assessed. Third, absolute gains and costs for the prevailing state will be 
uncovered. 
Conditions of Power 
The above analysis shows how the criterion of a causal relationship be-
tween the Xayaburi Dam and the impact in terms of power in the Laos–
Vietnam relation – that is, between the actor that is supposed to increase 
its power and the target – is satisfied. Undoubtedly, the Government of 
Laos’s green light for the project was ultimately the crucial factor causing 
a change in relational power terms. In other words, the realisation of the 
dam resulted in an outcome that went against Vietnam’s preferences and 
interests and, thus, in a situation in which Laos prevailed, because of its 
decision to build it in the first place and then because of all the necessary 
preliminary tasks (arrangements with Thai stakeholders, MRC proce-
dures) to be carried out in order to reach the goal of building it. With 
respect to goal attainment, the findings presented in the assessment of 
preferences above clearly point to the fact that the outcome was con-
sistent with Laos’s preferences and against Vietnamese ones. Moreover, 
Laos, having decided to go ahead with the project, was stuck with its 
decision from 2007 to 2012 and consistently promoted its goals, pressur-
ing Vietnam to adapt. The analysis of the negotiation process demon-
strated that Laos acted cautiously, conscious of its status, but from 2007 
never stopped or changed its plans. A clear example of this can be found 
in the GoL’s behaviour in mid-2011 after the PNPCA procedure: it first 
showed an accommodating attitude when Laos’s prime minister assured 
                                                 
8  “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 202–203). 
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his Vietnamese counterpart that the Xayaburi project had stopped, but at 
the same time was undertaking all necessary steps in order to move on 
with the infrastructure. 
Forms of Power 
With respect to forms of power, the findings are in line with Goh’s 
(2016) key assumption that, in a power relation shaped by opposing 
interests, power would take the form of hard power, and coercion would be 
the most important tool exploited by the prevailing actor, despite the 
potential coexistence of softer forms of power. Rather than being in-
duced or persuaded to accept the Xayaburi Dam, Vietnam was forced to 
accept the fait accompli and Laos’s unilateral decision to go ahead with the 
construction despite Vietnam’s strong disagreement with the project. 
Vietnam’s opposition is indisputable (as clearly confirmed by the official 
statements against the dam made within the MRC framework by the 
Vietnamese president, Truong Tan Sang, just before Laos organised the 
ground-breaking ceremony, and by the interview with the Vietnamese 
diplomat reported above). However, despite its attempts to change 
Laos’s plans, Vietnam was forced to comply, mainly by geopolitical con-
straints, which meant that a stronger reaction towards Laos’s plans was 
not strategically viable. In fact, in refusing Hanoi’s requests for a 10-year 
moratorium, suspending the project until more studies were conducted 
on its impact downstream, Laos coerced Vietnam into accepting the 
construction of the dam, displaying hard power. This was also manifest-
ed in assertive declarations by Laos leaders, such as responding to Vi-
etnam’s further requests to stop the project by rejecting them and saying: 
“After six months, all you can do is record the difference of opinions 
and that is the end of the process” (Chen 2013). Therefore, Vietnam was 
forced to comply in order to avoid the costly consequences signalled by Laos’s 
behaviour. As comprehensively pointed out in the analysis of the negoti-
ations, Vientiane managed to end up in such a coercive position thanks 
to a skilful (and conscious) mobilisation of the geopolitical resources that 
could support its hydropower goal.  
First, Laos leveraged Thailand’s interests (and then its stakes), facing 
Thai interests and stakes could have been compared to “starting a war”, 
as Viraphonh Viravong, the Lao Vice Minister of Energy and Mines, put 
it. Second, as acknowledged by Stuart-Fox and by the interviewed Viet-
namese diplomat, leveraging the importance of the special relationship 
between Laos and Vietnam could, in the light of China’s potential com-
petition for influence in Laos, have provoked costly consequences for 
Hanoi. Lao officials appeared well aware of these constraints, as was 
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made clear in the interview in which a Lao official in the MRC stated: 
“without China we would have had a very different story” (Inter- 
viewee 2). 
Moreover, the findings are also coherent with Goh’s assumption 
that, in practice, a combination of coercion, inducement and persuasion 
is likely to occur, although in the Xayaburi case hard forms of power are 
preponderant. Laos managed to some extent (the findings prove that it 
at least tried) to persuade Vietnam by presenting itself as a small and 
poor country that might only develop its economy by becoming the 
‘battery of Southeast Asia’. The presence of this softer form of power 
clearly emerged in the quote from an official of the Lao National Me-
kong Committee, who stressed the broader bilateral ties in conjunction 
with a minimisation of the Xayaburi project’s negative impact for Vi-
etnam, suggesting that “a very small fish that might not be able to pass 
through the Xayaburi Dam” should not compromise the excellent his-
torical ties between the two countries (Interviewee 3). 
Outcome 
In terms of absolute gains and costs, the balance appears to be clearly in 
Laos’s favour since it secured its main interest of building the Xayaburi 
Dam and succeeded diplomatically by testing the special relationship, 
while facing only minor costs, such as the delay of the project caused by 
Vietnam’s opposition (both within the MRC and bilaterally) and the need 
to revise the original design in order to meet Hanoi’s demands, which led 
to additional costs of 100 million USD. The resulting costs were lower 
than the gains from pursuing one of the most important national eco-
nomic policies – that is, becoming a leading hydropower exporter in the 
region – as well as from the concrete and direct economic benefits that 
will be generated by the Xayaburi Dam, which will generate around 4 
billion USD throughout the 29-year concession period that ends in 2048. 
In addition, the infrastructure provides potential control over the flow of 
the river and could therefore become a “weapon” at Laos’s disposal. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, for Laos the Xayaburi Dam negotiation represented a clear 
success over Vietnam once the distance between the project’s economic 
benefits for Laos and the risks and costs caused to Vietnam are taken 
into account. The article highlights that geopolitical constraints played a 
key role in limiting Vietnam’s leverage and its capacity to implement 
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effective countermeasures able to prevent Laos going ahead with the 
construction of the dam. In fact, the analysis of how the broader geopo-
litical context was intertwined with the bilateral asymmetric negotiations 
between Laos and Vietnam over the Xayaburi Dam demonstrates that 
other states had direct or indirect interests in influencing the outcome. 
However, given that such pressures were not unidirectional – Thailand 
and China supported Laos, but the United States aligned with Vietnam 
(and Cambodia) in opposition – Laos has been able to mobilise and 
leverage such interests in order to achieve its goals despite opposition 
from Hanoi. The involvement of a plurality of actors in the negotiation 
provided a source of diplomatic diversification for Vientiane, while for 
Hanoi this translated into competition for influence in Laos. Finally, the 
relational power analysis demonstrates that the Xayaburi Dam allowed 
Laos to increase its relational power over Vietnam, securing its interests 
despite the divergences and power asymmetry with Hanoi. 
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